Migrant remittances have been an important part of economic development for many years; however, they became an important element of neo-transitional economies only recently. In post-Soviet countries, migrant remittances grew rapidly over the past decade and reached staggering levels. Remittances in some countries have become a major driver of economic development, and are larger in scope than foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign assistance. For example, in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan remittances now account for over 10% of GDP. Research in the area is largely sparse primarily due to lack of accessible data and recent nature of the phenomenon. The study is set to contribute in closing this gap.
Introduction
Migrant remittances in the former Soviet Union are a relatively recent trend. However, they became an important element of neo-transitional economies from the beginning of the 2000s. The growth rate of remittances over the past decade is remarkable. In some countries of the former Soviet Union, remittances have reached staggering levels. For example, in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan remittances now account for over 10% of GDP, with Tajikistan leading the pack with annual remittances of approximately 40% of GDP. Remittances in this group of economies now exceed foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign assistance.
Because this rapid rise in remittances is a relatively recent trend and obtaining reliable data is difficult, this area of research has been underexplored.
Data availability improved in 2006 when the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) began
publishing data on money transfers from Russia through money transfer operators (MTOs) by recipient country. Moreover, the CBR publishes the cross-border transactions of individuals (both residents and non-residents) conducted through all credit institutions (including MTOs). The statistics demonstrate that the largest proportion of remittances is channeled through MTOs. In 2012, the total volume of cross-border flows to the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries via all credit institutions equaled $19.2 billion, whereas money transfers through MTOs amounted to $18.2 billion. Approximately 80% of this $1 billion difference is due to transfers to Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia -countries with more developed financial systems 1 .
Remittances to these countries are often sent using bank wire transfers. The fact that the majority of remittances are conducted via MTOs is unfortunate because remittances sent through the banking sector are more likely to be retained within the banking sector in the form of deposits and therefore possess greater potential for economic development.
The datasets published by the Central Bank of Russia allow estimation of the volume of remittances from Russia to the former Soviet republics. Because Russia is the major source of remittances for these economies, the estimation and analysis of these flows is very important for economic policy making in neo-transitional economies. The aim of this paper is to undertake a comprehensive review of existing knowledge on the scope, scale and estimation methodologies applicable to ex-Soviet republics, as well as contemporary challenges. Moreover, we suggest a potential method to improve the accuracy of remittances estimation, by adjusting data published by the Central Bank of Russia. Global financial crisis had a significant term impact on remittances from Russia. However, despite its continuous drag on the global financial markets, decline in remittances from Russia was very brief. In 2009, remittances from Russia bounced back and currently greatly exceed pre-crisis levels. Some post-Soviet economies are major recipients of remittances and as a group account for as much as 10% of remittances worldwide. There have been attempts to provide this type of estimation in individual countries however there have been no studies, to our knowledge, that provide a comprehensive analysis of remittances and their estimation problems that propose ways to improve estimation accuracy for the region.
Remittances in this region frequently flow through unofficial channels. Moreover, a large share of petty trade is disguised as remittances which makes the accurate estimation of remittances difficult (Ibragimova et al., 2008; Mughal, 2007; Rustamov, 2008) . Therefore, we propose adjusting the official statistics to account for informal remittances and petty trade. This paper consists of seven sections. Section 2 briefly introduces the institutional setting in which the flow of remittances to the post-Soviet region takes place. This section also describes the trends, magnitude and importance of these flows for the economies of the former Soviet Union. Section 3 reviews the concept of remittances as defined in the 5 th and 6 th editions of the IMF Balance of Payments Manuals. Although the most recent 6 th edition significantly revised the concept of remittances, its definition is still hampered by practical and methodological problems.
Section 4 describes the problems involved in the estimation of remittances in the former Soviet Union. Section 5 analyzes and briefly evaluates some alternative methods to estimate remittances utilized by practitioners and researchers. In section 6, we propose adjustments to more accurately estimate remittances from Russia to selected former Soviet countries. Finally, section 7 summarizes the major findings of the paper. This section also provides suggestions to improve the remittance measurement framework.
The Institutional Setting for Remittances in the Post-Soviet Region
In 2012, the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS) estimated the number of labor migrants entering the country to be approximately 11-14 million people per year.
According to the FMS, 77% of these migrants come from the CIS (RIA-Novosti, 2012) .
Following this migration flow in the 2000s, the scale of remittances in the post-Soviet region has also increased dramatically. Russia is the largest migrant receiving country and the main source of remittances into the other members of the CIS. According to the Central Bank of Russia, the total amount of money transfers sent from Russia to other CIS states increased by a factor of 36 between 1999 and 2012, that is, from $0.5 billion to $19.205 billion (CBR, 2012) .
The main recipients of remittances in the post-Soviet region are Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.
Although there are no precise estimates, it is a stylized fact that remittances from Russia constitute the majority of remittances in these economies. Financial transfer channels between the major remittance recipient countries in the former Soviet Union and Russia can be divided into two categories: "formal" or "official" and "informal" or "unofficial" remittance channels. The official channels utilize banks and money transfer operators. Unofficial channels utilize friends, relatives, methods similar to "hawala" 2 , exchange through electronic accounts and transporting money themselves.
Armenia provides a good example of the disarray in the estimation of remittances. Tumasyan et al. (2008) , based on a survey of 3000 respondents in (Shelburne and Palacin, 2007) . The survey conducted by Tumasyan et al. (2008) indicated that 58% of all remittances were received through banks and MTOs. That same survey reported that 76.9% of all remittances originated in Russia. However, another survey conducted by Central Bank of Armenia in 2005 suggests that 78% of all remittances were received via banks and MTOs (Central Bank of Armenia, 2006) . Different estimates of remittances to Azerbaijan are also difficult to reconcile. A survey conducted with funding from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimated total remittances to Azerbaijan at $428 million in 2006, whereas the balance of payments data for Azerbaijan suggests workers' remittances and migrant transfers through MTOs and banks of $679 million (Rustamov, 2008) . The same survey found that transfers through MTOs and banks accounted for 32% of remittances to Azerbaijan in 2006, which increases the total amount of remittances to Azerbaijan to $2.1 billion. Data from the Russian Central Bank suggest remittances from Russia through MTOs and postal offices alone of $440 million (Shelburne and Palacin, 2007) .
Russia was the source of 83% of all remittances to Azerbaijan in 2006 (Rustamov, 2008) .
Despite the aggravation of political relations between Georgia and Russia in 2006, Russia continues to generate a significant flow of remittances to Georgia. The Russian Federation accounted for 56% of remittances to Georgia in 2010 (Melkadze, 2012) . This same study noted data from the National Bank of Georgia estimating that the total amount of remittances sent through official channels to Georgia in 2011 Bank reported remittances to Kyrgyzstan from Russia for the same year of $438 million (Shelburne and Palacin, 2007) . Russia accounted for 82% of remittances to Kyrgyzstan in 2006 (Ibragimova et al., 2008) . This report also found that nearly 78% of all remittances to Kyrgyzstan were transferred through banks and MTOs in 2006. Mogilevsky and Atamanov (2008) noted that large ($10,000-50,000) and very large (more than $50,000) transactions made up 22% and 72% of all remittances, respectively, and concluded that the majority of funds in these types of transactions are actually the revenues of shuttle traders and repayments of loans for trade deals. The following balance of payments data from the National Bank of Ukraine, presented in Table 1 , were prepared according to the 6 th edition of the IMF Balance of Payments and International Investment Manual of IMF: 
Review of Remittances Measurement Methodologies
To understand the challenges encountered in measuring remittances, it is useful to define the major concepts. The sixth edition of the IMF Balance of Payments and
International Investment Position Manual (International Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 272) notes that "remittances represent household income from foreign economies arising mainly from the temporary or permanent movement of people to those economies."
Remittances include cash and noncash items that flow through formal channels, such as wire transfers, or through informal channels, such as money or goods carried across borders. Remittances consist primarily of funds and noncash items from individuals who have migrated to a new country and became residents there; these funds also include the net compensation of border, seasonal, or other short-term workers who are employed in an economy in which they are not resident. According to the IMF (International Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 272) , "The two items in the balance of payments framework that substantially relate to remittances are "compensation of employees" and "personal transfers." Both of these standard components are recorded in the current account".
Total remittances encompass personal remittances, which consist of the compensation of employees, personal transfers, and capital transfers between households and social benefits. Social benefits include "benefits payable under social security funds and pension funds. They may be in cash or in kind" (International Monetary Fund, 2009, p. 213) . Thus, the total amount of remittances includes income from individuals working abroad for short periods, from individuals residing abroad and sending transfers, and from social benefits from abroad.
The most notable change in the new edition of BPM6 that is relevant to remittances is in "personal transfers," which replaces the concept "workers'
remittances" in the BPM5. In addition, the new manual includes transferrable social benefits in the definition of remittances.
Many authors have previously criticized the definition of "workers' remittances"
for its link to the UN's concept of a long-term migrant, which consists of residents staying for 12 months or more (Alfieri et al., 2006) . This concept excluded seasonal migrants and second -generation migrants. The exclusion of seasonal migrants and their remittances in the former Soviet Union was especially misleading because labor migration in this region is predominantly seasonal. Furthermore, the previous definition of remittances included only officially recorded migrants and their families. However, it is estimated that majority of labor migrants from former Soviet Union countries working in Russia are not frequently given formal labor agreements by their employers.
In some cases, remittances might be channeled through employers and acquaintances in Russia. Therefore, these payments are not captured in the BoP statistics on remittances.
The distinctive Accounts' definition, encompasses all transfers from residents to non-residents whatever the source of income, the relationship between them, and the purpose of the transfer. In addition, the BPM6 also extends the concept of total remittances and transfers to non-profit institutions serving households (NPISHs). This item is the sum of personal remittances, social benefits (defined as "disposable income from abroad"), and current transfers to NPISHs. The BPM6 significantly broadens and improves the conceptualization of remittances in previous definitions. However, the revision further complicates the measurement of remittances. For instance, practical problems in identifying particular population groups, such as second -generation migrants, utilizing survey data often prevent their inclusion in measurement (Lerch et al., 2008) .
Therefore, many countries either do not report remittances in BoP or provide extremely inaccurate estimates.
As noted above, some migrant workers (in the case of labor migration in the CIS, most likely the majority of workers) reside in a recipient country temporarily and seasonally. Upon returning home, many migrants bring personal assets that will be owned by the household of origin. However, this type of asset is nearly impossible to account for in balance of payments transactions; therefore, these are not recorded as transfers. These in-kind transfers resemble imports of foreign goods. Unlike cash transfers that can be invested or utilized to purchase locally produced goods, these imports have, at best, no effect on GDP. In some cases, they may even have a negative substitution effect.
Furthermore, the new definitions include the compensation of employees in the measure of remittances and do not suggest a methodology for separating the part of compensation of short-term workers sent or returned to the country of origin.
Obviously, not all of the income that individuals earn while working abroad will be transferred to the country of origin, and some of this money will be spent in the recipient country. For instance, Shelburne and Palacin (2007) , referring to a 2005
World Bank survey, note that workers from Tajikistan spent approximately half of the income they earned in Russia for living expenses in Russia.
The propensity to spend in a host country might differ for migrants from various countries. Migrants from countries with levels of higher per capita income might be inclined to spend more in a host country compared to those from a country with a lower level of per capita income.
The underreporting of received remittances in surveys is observed in many countries (Shonkwiler et al., 2011) . Possible reasons for this underreporting include:
(i) the perceived risk of taxation of remittance income by the less educated population and (ii) the fear that a substantial amount of remittances may affect eligibility to receive payments or benefits from state and foreign aid organizations. Shonkwiler et al. (2011) note another potential reason -understating wealth/income to limit the demands of poorer relatives and neighbors for informal loans and advances to support their livelihood.
Thus, despite major improvements to the definition of remittances in the IMF exists. More precise measurement of remittances requires some adjustments. This precision is important to the proper evaluation of the impact of remittances on various types of economic activities in countries receiving these remittances. Current remittance measurement tools, econometric models, and worldwide surveys suffer from serious problems. These methods are unlikely to measure remittances with a high degree of accuracy not only because migration and remittances are an infrequent, although growing phenomena, but also because of various complex issues entailed in migration and remittances (Lerch et al., 2008) .
In cases where the data is sufficient to produce reliable estimates of the size of official transfers (e.g., Russia-CIS remittances where the outflow of workers' remittances is calculated utilizing data provided by MTOs and special banks), it is possible to estimate the total amount of remittances if the ratio of informal to formal remittances is known. This calculation is based on the assumption that labor migrants and their families have little incentive to lie about which channel they utilize to remit funds (Mughal, 2007) . However, even in such cases, not all of the transfers are related to migrants' transfers because some of them could be related to trade. In other words, part of the transfers via MTOs must be classified as the export receipts of shuttle traders. This ratio may vary significantly for transfers from different migrant receiving countries. The proportion of remittances transferred through MTOs for neighboring countries such as Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan or Russia-Belarus might seem insignificant because migrants prefer to carry cash themselves when returning to their country of origin. The ratio of informal to formal remittances is unlikely to remain constant over time and is very sensitive to transfer commission fees charged by MTOs, MTO branch network both in host and home countries, migrants literacy in using financial services, as well as legal complexity/documentation requirements for sending and receiving funds using MTOs.
In general, our definition of remittances encompasses both transfers through financial system as well as cash returned to the home country. In-kind transfers appear to be associated with a small -scale trade, and a sizeable share of small scale trade is disguised as remittances in the CIS, which we exclude from estimates of total remittances. In the next section, we will discuss the relationship between formal and informal transfers in the former Soviet Union in greater detail.
Remittances and Remittance Transfer Channels in the Former Soviet Union.
Until very recently, it was customary to transfer money through a network of relatives and acquaintances, train and airplane crews, bus drivers, and delivery services. reported that 30% of labor migrants utilized official channels and 70% utilized unofficial channels. This survey also indicated that 70% of migrants from Moldova were undocumented (Black et al., 2007) . 
Recent reductions in rates by

Estimation Methods
The goal of this section is to undertake the analysis of the remittances estimation challenges in post-Soviet countries and discuss applicability of existing remittances estimation methods that may help us to overcome some of those challenges.
Ultimately, we aim to arrive with a method which will provide us more accurate data on remittances in the former Soviet republics.
Both the small-scale survey conducted by an author and other studies in this area indicate that most funds are currently transferred through MTOs. However, there is still a significant fraction of remittances made using informal channels, which is not captured by official statistics. Moreover, inaccuracies may arise by treating some transfers as remittances whereas they are, in fact, payments for small-scale shuttle trade. Therefore, a researcher attempting to study the effects of remittances on these economies should make appropriate adjustments to the data to improve its accuracy.
Accurate estimation of remittances in this region is further hampered by the fact that the majority of the former Soviet economies do not publish remittance data consistent with IMF methodological guidelines. On the contrary, some countries, such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, either publish very limited statistics or do not publish remittances statistics at all. In other cases, data quality is questionable, and different methodologies hamper verification of the data on remittances from other sources (Shelburne and Palacin, 2007) . This problem is not limited to this region; the quality of remittance data is poor globally (Kapur, 2004; Lerch et al., 2008; Shelburne and Palacin, 2007) . In contrast, some of the former Soviet republics, such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Moldova, and Russia, provide more statistics on remittance senders and recipients than most countries in the world. However, data problems exist and policy makers, central banks, and scholars examining remittances resort to particular measurement methods or surveys to produce estimations.
One estimation methodology, a gravity model, traditionally utilized to explain trade and FDI, can also be applied to explain variations in bilateral remittances as in Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) . Elaborating on concepts developed by Zipf (1946) Switzerland. The number of documented foreign workers is multiplied by mean wage to calculate the earnings of migrants. Residents are divided into those who reside and work in Switzerland with short-term, one-year, and permanent permits. Then, the SNB, without providing a justification, assigns fixed percentages of the average wage that these three groups of migrants send home -25%, 12% and 5%. In addition, border workers are assumed to remit 100% of their earnings. Thus, this very simple model does consider differences in the transfer behavior of migrants from various countries.
According to Lerch et al. (2008) , the US Bureau of Economic Analysis utilizes a more sophisticated model based on data from the US Census and the annual American Community Survey. These two sources collect data on all foreign-born residents, including undocumented migrants. This model incorporates many other factors important to the remittance decision, such as duration of residence, presence of children, and macroeconomic data for the recipient countries.
The Adjustment Methodology and Its Application to Remittances in the Former Soviet Republics
The previous section of this paper reviewed several methodologies for estimating remittances. Some of these methodologies, e.g., the gravity model and the model of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, yield quite reasonable estimates of remittances but fail to include shocks such as economic crises and differences in remittance Table 4 below summarizes the remittance fees applicable for average amount of transfer for respective years based on data from Central Bank of Russia and associated with it decrease in the share of informal remittances estimated by authors. We sourced the data for share of informal remittances from existing surveys (see , Table 3 ) and link the rate of annual decline in the share of informal remittances with the reduction in transfer fees. These adjustments produce an estimate of $5.952 billion in remittances to Uzbekistan in 2012. Because remittance transfer fees have decreased over time and awareness of the decrease spread gradually, the adjustment factor for informal channels has fallen gradually from 40% for 2006 to 13.91% in 2012. Table 5 below summarizes these calculations for Uzbekistan. (CBR 2007 (CBR , 2008a (CBR , 2009 (CBR , 2010 (CBR , 2011 (CBR , 2012 Consider the example of remittances from Russia to Azerbaijan. Based on a survey of 3900 households, Rustamov (2008) Soviet Union in the same pattern, it is assumed that the share of informal transfers has also been changing in a fashion similar to the pattern observed in Uzbekistan. Petersburg which is far away from the border of Russia with Azerbaijan. Therefore, it is probably more convenient for them to transfer funds to Azerbaijan than bringing cash home in their pockets. However, the fact that the results of our estimations coincide with the survey estimations of Rustamov (2008) suggests that our methodology is good enough to make meaningful estimations. All in all, it seems that in the case of remittances from the CIS, this methodology makes quite precise estimations.
Similar estimates were produced for other countries of the former USSR (except Baltic countries). They are available from the authors upon request.
We made substantial adjustments to the estimates of remittances produced by Shelburne and Palacin (2007) prior to 2007 and to the data published by the Central Bank of Russia. These new estimates substantially change the value of remittances in some cases and could be used to analyze the impact of remittances in the economies of major recipients. Because remittances from Russia are by far the most significant source of remittances within the CIS, these data approximate the total amount of remittances that these countries receive.
Conclusion
This study has provided a comprehensive review of existing remittance measurement methodologies relevant to the countries of the former Soviet Union. This study also discussed problems with the IMF BoP framework and inaccuracies and weaknesses in other data sources.
The empirical evidence suggests that the share of formal remittance channels is growing at the expense of informal channels in the CIS. Labor migrants understand that carrying cash is risky -the money could be stolen or corrupt customs and passport control officers could expropriate part or all of this money. If a migrant sends earnings with another person, there is a risk that the money courier may deceive the sender.
The utilization of formal and informal channels also varies according to the distance separating the sending and receiving countries. Interviews and surveys also suggest that other factors can determine the choice of formal over informal channels:
the education level of the migrant, the nature of employment, the presence of a migrant community/network, the average salary level, etc. More educated and white -collar migrants tend to send more money via MTOs.
The sheer size and significance of remittances makes harnessing this economic phenomenon to benefit the economy reasonable. Policies to increase the share funds transferred through formal channels rather than informal channels would be a first step in this direction. However, the eventual success of this first step depends on the institutional capacity of the financial/banking sector to transform the development potential of remittances into benefits for the country.
The aim of this paper was to review the remittance estimation methodologies and challenges in post-Soviet region as well as to propose some adjustments that may improve accuracy of remittance estimations. We believe this goal has been achieved.
Despite its deficiencies the methods have reasonable empirical confirmation from existing surveys. This new methodology has a potential to be utilized in other regions and countries experiencing similar data challenges. 
